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ABSTRACT
Do  jurisdictions  with  concentrated  ownership  structures  require  less  reliance  on  audits  as 
corporate governance mechanisms and devices? Why do concentrated ownership structures still 
prevail in certain jurisdictions which are considered to be “market based corporate governance 
systems”?  More  importantly,  if  failures  and  causes  of  recent  financial  crises  are  principally 
attributable to the fact that market based corporate governance mechanisms, such as financial 
regulators, are not optimally performing their functions, why is the role of audits still paramount 
in such jurisdictions? These are amongst some of the questions which this paper attempts to 
address.
The  ever  increasing  growth  of  institutional  investors  in  jurisdictions  –  particularly  those 
jurisdictions with predominantly concentrated ownership structures, with their increased stakes 
in corporate equity, also raises the issue of accountability and the question as regards whether 
increased  accountability  is  fostered  where  institutional  investors  assume a  greater  role  –  as 
opposed to position which exists where increased stake of family holdings (family controlled 
structures) arises.
Key  Words:  audit  quality,  corporate  governance,  concentrated  ownership  structures,  capital 
market economies, institutional investors
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A Introduction: Audits As Vital Signalling Devices In Capital Markets
The audit serves (and should serve) as a vital capital market signalling mechanism that conveys 
quality  information  to  the  markets,  investors  and  other  users  of  financial  information,  that 
information provided by the financial statements, financial reports of an enterprise, through its 
management, is relatively reliable. From this perspective, it may be asked whether accurately 
conveying information about the financial situation or position of a firm to investors, prevents or 
mitigates the likelihood of the occurrence of systemic risks. Further, would the mitigation of 
information asymmetries within capital markets and the financial industry as a whole, reduce the 
possibility of systemic risks occurring?
It could be argued that conveying accurate and credible information about the financial situation 
of a firm or enterprise to its investors, could actually trigger bank runs – if the audit generates a 
negative signal – that is, if the auditor issues a qualified opinion about the financial statements. 
The manner whereby the opinion is conveyed to the investors then becomes crucial in preventing 
bank runs. Even timely information could trigger bank runs – the “when” then probably becomes 
as important as “how” the information is handled.Whilst the level of inaccuracy or accuracy of 
the  information  conveyed  by  audits  certainly  has  its  repercussions,  their  role  in  addressing 
information asymmetries is quite evident. If audits are as reliable as they should be, whether or 
not they generate negative or positive signals, the timeliness, completeness and accuracy levels 
of such information – as well as the manner with which such information is handled, will be 
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3crucial to the triggering or avoidance of systemic risks. In this sense, a clear link between the 
quality of information, informational asymmetries and systemic risks can be established.
B. Audit Quality and Concentrated Ownership Structures
In matters relating to information asymmetries, it may appear that audits and audit quality, play a 
more vital role in capital market based dispersed ownership systems than concentrated ownership 
structures. According to Goshen and Hamdani (2013:6), „control  matters  for  entrepreneurs 
because  it  allows  them  to overcome  asymmetric  information  vis-à-vis  investors  and  pursue 
their business idea in whatever manner they see fit, thereby securing their ability to capture the 
idiosyncratic value that they attach to their execution of their business  idea.“
However, as commented by Clarke and dela Rama (2008:7). …... „the belief in the disapperance 
of the control by proprietary interests of the largest corporations, is to be questioned, not only 
given the patterns of ownership holdings within and between corporations“, but also because of 
„the extent of interlocking directorships, connections with banks and other financial institutions, 
as well as their real owners, and wider networks or ownership and influence.“
This is further illustrated by the situation with the United States, the „archetype of the market 
based corporate governance system“, whereby it is revealed that i) 59% of listed US corporations 
have a controlling shareholder – a situation considered higher than that which exists in Japan; 
ii)that 36% of US corporations family-controlled (a situation which is similar to the position 
which exists in Germany, but higher than the situation which exists in the UK, France or Japan); 
and iii) that 24% of US corporations are controlled and managed by a family – a similar situation 
to that which exists in East Asia  (Clarke and dela Rama, 2008:7,8; Gadhoum et al: 2008, cited).
As  well  as  the  increased  role  assumed  by  institutional  investors  (as  opposed  to  individual 
investors),  the  controversial  nature  and  difficulty  of  distinguishing  between  ownership  and 
4control is further illustrated by Clarke and dela Rama (2008:9), who highlight the fact that even 
though ownership and management may comprise of different people, they may not be separate.
The ever increasing role of institutional investors in jurisdictions with concentrated ownership 
structures, with their increased stakes in corporate equity, also raises the issue of accountability 
and  the  question  as  regards  whether  increased  accountability  is  fostered  where  institutional 
investors assume a greater role – as opposed to increased stake of family holdings.
Goshen  and  Hamdani  (2013:  4) argue  that  unlike  diversified   minority   shareholders,   a 
controlling shareholder „typically  shoulders  the  costs  of  being  largely  undiversified  and 
illiquid.“
In trying to reason why the controlling shareholder chooses to retain control, they respond to this 
by adding that agency costs,  „the availability of private benefits  of control“,  provided a key 
solution to this reasoning, since in their opinion, the controlling shareholder  could implement 
the  dominant  position  to   „consume private   benefits“  such  as  self-dealing  transactions,  the 
employment of family members,  at  the  expense  of  minority  shareholders.“
The success, survival and resilience of many family controlled enterprises is evidenced in the 
U.S – as well as several parts of continental Europe. A factor which could be attributed to this is 
that  such  structures  compel  a  higher  degree  of  accountability  than  that  which  is  typically 
manifested  by dispersed ownership structures in marked based corporate governance structures 
or those concentrated ownership structures which are largely governed by institutional investors. 
Such level of accountability and committment to the firm also constitutes a plausible explanation 
for the requirement and proposals that management of several enterprises retain blocks of shares 
for a reasonable period of time – a demonstration of their loyalty, as well as their commitment to 
the interests of the firm. 
The  “unlocking”  and  discernment  of  owners  in  complex  ownership  structures  will  certainly 
provide a means to greater fulfilment of the goals of Board independence – a key feature in 
jurisdictions such as the UK where the distinction between the Board of directors, non-executive 
5directors  and  chairmen  of  the  company,  has  become  paramount  –  particularly  since  the 
introduction of the Cadbury Report in 1992. The Cadbury Report has certainly paved the way for 
greater reforms which have resulted in a more refined Combined Code of Corporate Governance 
– as evidenced by the Higgs Report.  As well  as directing attention to the importance of the 
definition of the role of the Board, the Higgs Report also accords great focus to the distinction 
between the roles of the chairman, chief executive and non independent executive directors.
C. Which Risks  are Worth  Bearing? Balancing Goals  and Objectives  of  Dispersed  
Ownership Structures and Concentrated Ownership Structures
Goshen and Hamdani  (2013:30)  state  that:  with  concentrated ownership structures,  investors 
face  the  risk  that  although  the  entrepreneur  will  efficiently manage  the  firm  and  realize 
the  idiosyncratic  value, there also exists the risk that commitment  to  share  residual  cash-
flows  pro-rata  will be avoided and that private benefits of control will be eliminated. Should job 
security (a feature and goal which many concentated ownership structures defend) preside over 
the goal of profit maximisation (or the need to secure the highest dividend payouts)? Clearly 
there should be a balance between these objectives – another possible explanation for the support 
towards the move to committments aimed at embracing wider stakeholders and  corporate social 
responsibility.  The need to balance goals and objectives, however, should also be complemented 
by weighing the devastating impact of firms' collapses  and the consequences of such collapses 
on wider stakeholders.
Even  though  it  has  been  argued  by  several  commentators  that  sanctioning  role  played  by 
regulatory bodies and financial markets in sanctioning management, constitute flaws which have 
contributed to the recent Financial Crisis, the role played by audits and auditors, however, have 
definitely also played a crucial role in contributing to many of the recent financial and corporate 
collapses.
Even though joint audits (that is, mid tier firms carrying out joint audits with Big Four firms, as a 
means of increasing their presence at international level,), has been  proposed and regarded as 
6“the priority step in tackling the concentration issue”,2 whether such audits can also facilitate 
greater levels of audit independence also constitutes an interesting matter.
D.  Ownership Rules of Audit Firms and Audit Market Concentration
The focus on ownership rules of audit firms, derives not only from consequences emanating for 
audit  market  concentration,  but  also  from  the  impact  generated  on  auditor  independence. 
Employee ownership, as well as “the resulting profit sharing amongst senior auditors” serves as 
good signaling mechanism of the quality of audit services to the market.3 The importance of 
retaining audit quality is also a concern in the bid to provide greater access,expansion and entry 
to the audit market. Would the admission of more players from the mid tier audit firms into the 
audit  market generate more positive impacts and consequences for audit  independence? It  is 
certainly  the  case  that  increased  audit  concentration  within  the  audit  market  certainly  has 
consequences for audit  independence since  there is less choice and competition between the 
firms in the market,  as  well  as  devastating consequences,  in  respect  of  systemic  risk,  if  the 
demise of another Big Four audit firm, should occur.
According  to  a  report  prepared  by  Oxera  for  the  European  Commission  (2007),  it  was 
highlighted that “the key question to be answered,  is  to what extent the corporate structures 
adopted by audit firms, whether driven by rules or by commercial factors, affect the market's 
ability to deliver a more open configuration that would reduce some of the concerns expressed 
about concentration and choice in the audit market.”
2  European Commission, Study on the effects of the implementation of the "acquis" on statutory audits of annual 
and consolidated accounts including the consequences on the audit market (2011) at page 6 of 9
     http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/auditing/reform/  
3 See European Commision, “Ownership Rules of Audit Firms and their Consequences For Audit Market 
Concentration” at page 88
7Main findings of the Report, as illustrated under the subheadings below, are as follows:
i ) Current ownership  rules and opportunities created by their  potential relaxation
− That  a  relaxation  of  current  ownership  and/or  management  rules  might  not  result  in 
immediate change in ownership structures of audit  firms,  but that  it  would, however, 
create a real possibility and provide incentives – such that alternative structures might 
emerge over time.
ii) Impact on access to capital 
− That there exists evidence from current literature that several aspects of the employee-
owned corporate form of ownership adopted by audit firms are likely to increase required 
rates of return of audit firms, as well as restrict their ability to access capital initially.
iii) Impact on entry and expansion into the market for large audits
− That restrictions on access to capital represents one of several potential barriers to entry 
into the market for large audits and particularly, capital was found to be critical only for 
those firms seeking to expand into the market for larger audits.
iv) Impact on auditor independence
− That main rationale for ownership and management restrictions is related to their impact 
on the independence of auditors from potentially negative outside influences.
From the above findings, the link between audits, audit quality and audit independence can be 
illustrated. Audit quality certainly has immense and considerable consequences – particularly in 
matters relating to audit concentration and moral hazard. The significance of the exit of another 
“Big Four” audit cannot be over emphasized. Hence greater appreciation should be accorded to 
the contribution made by mid tier  audit  firms,  as well  as their  potential  in facilitating more 
objectivity and greater independence – particularly where they are involved in collaborations 
such as joint audits.
8E. Conclusion: Sending the Right Signals to the Market
Sending the right signal to the markets – that no firm, and certainly, no Big Four audit firm, is 
“too big to fail” is of immense importance in addressing the issue of moral hazard. In this sense, 
greater acknowledgement is to be given to mid tier audit firms through an appreciation of their 
ability to contribute to audit quality. Whilst adequate and appropriate punitive sanctions should 
be directed at  the management  of a  firm,  audit  firms and their  roles in  corporate  collapses, 
constitute  ever  increasing focal  points  –  particularly given the  recent  trend demonstrated  by 
concentated ownership structures – a move towards capital market based governance structures.
Even though family owned structures are to be commended in fostering greater accountability 
and commitment,  an increased trend towards the growth of institutional investors and the need 
for increased monitoring – both internally and external to the corporate structures, warrants an 
effective corporate governance device which would not only enhance greater transparency, but 
also facilitate greater disclosure within corporate structures (and particularly, complex corporate 
structures).    
The lack of adequate mandatory audit  firm rotation is  also a feature and element which has 
affected audit quality over the past years. Whilst it is certainly beneficial to retain the services of 
an audit firm for a certain period of time – given benefits which accrue from having acquired in-
depth knowledge about the client firm, disadvantages could arise owing to impaired judgement 
and the ability to objectively approach a matter as independently as is expected of such an audit 
firm. Familiarity or an undue degree of familiarity with the records of a client firm, could also 
facilitate cover-ups and creative accounting practices which have been so evident from recent 
and previous financial crises. 
Up till 2013, there had been no requirement at European level for the mandatory rotation of audit 
firms  –  even  though  some  member  states  had  gone  further  than  Article  42  of  Directive 
2006/43/EC  in  requiring  mandatory  audit  firm  rotation.  This  however,  has  changed  with 
9mandatory requirement – pursuant to a draft law that would “require public-interest entities such 
as banks, insurance firms, and listed companies to rotate audit firms every 14 years”(and such 
period could be extended to 25 years when certain safeguards are put into place).4 Other notable 
features of the Draft Law also include:5
− Prohibition of “Big Four-only” contractual clauses that require a company’s audit to be 
done by one of the Big Four accounting firms (Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG, and 
PwC). 
− Requirement  that  auditors  of  public-interest  entities  (PIEs)  publish  audit  reports 
according  to  international  standards  and  provide  shareholders  and  investors  with  a 
detailed understanding of what the auditor did and an overall assurance of the accuracy of 
the company’s accounts. 
− Prohibition of audit firms from providing non-audit services that could jeopardize 
independence.
Proposals,  legislation and efforts  aimed at  encouraging  partnerships  between Big Four  audit 
firms and mid tier firms are also welcomed, as well as external investments in mid tier audit 
firms  – provided that audit quality is retained. Reducing the audit expectations gap is another 
aspect which needs to be accorded greater focus as this would contribute immensely towards 
addressing informational asymmetries between users of information conveyed about the financial 
statements  and  reports  (and  principally  stakeholders  of   firms)  and  the  management  of  a 
firm.Whilst conveying the most accurate information is certainly not guaranteed to ensure that 
bank runs will not occur, the manner in which such information is handled could prove crucial in 
averting  devastating  consequences  of  systemic  risks.  In  this  sense,  the  auditor  bears  the 
4  “The idea of mandatory audit firm rotation also is being explored elsewhere. The UK Competition Commission 
is considering imposing term limits for large listed companies and will come to a final decision by Oct. 20.
In  the  United  States,  the  PCAOB has  been  studying  the  issue  of  mandatory audit  firm rotation  for  public 
companies since issuing a concept release that included the topic in August 2011. However, a  PCAOB member 
has also highlighted  that many obstacles make adoption of mandatory audit firm rotation unlikely.”
K Tysiac, „Europe Takes Step Toward Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation“, Journal of Accountancy  April 2013 
http://www.journalofaccountancy.com/news/20137862.htm
5 See ibid
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responsibility of ensuring that audits are properly carried out whilst management needs to ensure 
that such information conveyed by audits is dispersed in a manner which not only serves the best 
interests of shareholders, but that of the market as a whole.  
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